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of organisational forms that emerge in different contextual circumstances, the relational 
approach has the capacity to comprehend the dynamic processes of change and 
development engendered by the diverse range and shifting intensities of relations 
between network actors (Boggs and Rantisi 2003:109).  However, few studies have 
managed to operationalise relational thinking or unpack how actors’ intentions and 
strategies relate to context, network and territorial embeddedness.    
 This paper addresses these issues by tracing how the dynamic changes that 
accompany geo-political and geo-economic crisis reveal the uneven and shifting nature 
of embedded network relationships. Its examination of the configuration of the Fiji-
Australia garment production network before and after the May 2000 coup d’etat in Fiji 
exposes the mechanisms through which different types of relations are created and 
reproduced and gauges their resilience in unstable contexts.  The paper contributes to 
the developing literature of global production networks by applying a relational 
theoretical framework to identify the conditions under which firms and places 
disconnect from production networks when institutional and political conditions change.  
The discussion highlights three issues that have not hitherto been incorporated 
sufficiently into the GPN approach.  First, it draws attention to the multi-dimensional 
notion of trust as a key conceptual category in understanding network formation and the 
nature of embeddedness.  Second, it highlights how, as changing geo-political and geo-
economic conditions transform institutional landscapes, trust and perceptions of risk 
interact with inter-firm power differentials to realign the configuration of production 
networks. Third, it reveals the scalar interdependencies between embeddedness, trust, and 
power.   
 The discussion is divided into six main sections.  Section Two develops a 
theoretical perspective in which the embedded relations of transnational production 
networks are produced by the interactions of trust and power.  Section Three introduces 
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the methodological orientation of the paper’s empirical content, describes the 
regulation-based interdependencies that created the Australia-Fiji garment production 
network, and identifies the configuration of relationships before the May 2000 coup.  
Section Four then analyses how geo-political and geo-economic crisis impacted on 
relationships and network structures.  It specifies the conditions under which Australian 
buyer firms withdrew from or curtailed their involvement in Fiji after the coup.  The 
penultimate section discusses the implications of these events for understanding 
embeddedness and the dynamic character of global production networks.  It stresses that 
geo-political crisis exposed the contingent nature of interpersonal relationships and the 
dynamic nature of network embeddedness.  The conclusion argues for a more dynamic 
and politically attuned concept of ‘embeddedness’ that is sensitive to shifting personal, 
firm and national allegiances.   
The Relational Nature of Embeddedness 
By viewing networks as ‘multi-dimensional, multi-layered lattices of economic 
activity’, the global production network (GPN) approach acknowledges that a diverse 
range of organisational formations can arise in different time- and space- contexts 
(Dicken et al, 2001; Dicken and Malmberg, 2001).  The GPN re-synthesis overcomes 
the increasingly stale binary between regional/agglomerative/cluster and 
global/dispersive/value chain metaphors of production systems.  In the process, it 
dissolves the analytical distinction between ‘vertical’ value-adding inter-linkages and 
‘horizontal’ territorial or social relationships.    
 One of the key differences between chain and cluster metaphors – and the 
difference that is the focus of this paper – has concerned the nature of the 
‘embeddedness’ of relationships. Value chain approaches view firms as embedded 
primarily in the sequence of interactions between buyers and sellers, while clusters 
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envision firms as embedded primarily in a range of place-based associations.  The 
tendency to conceive linear chains as disembedded from territories has limited their 
capacity to comprehend the influence of places, intermediaries, associated sectors and 
institutional arrangements (see Glennie and Thrift, 1993; Hartwick, 1998; Leslie and 
Reimer, 1999; Raikes et al, 2000). One the other hand, concentrating on place-based 
clustering can lead to an over-territorialised perspective (Hess, 2004), an over-emphasis 
on the interpersonal dimension of production networks, an undervaluing of structural 
influences (Yeung 2002) and an overly convivial vision of embeddedness (Sayer 2002).    
In addition, the chain versus cluster dichotomy has been undermined by a growing body 
of evidence demonstrating that competitiveness involves a complicated mix of 
proximate and global relations (Maskell 2003); that relationships between firms cannot 
be read from geographical proximity (Yeung, 1998); that cross-border supply chains 
and local production complexes share common patterns of information and knowledge 
flows (Gertler, 2003); and that ‘closeness’ is frequently de-territorialised (Bunnell and 
Coe, 2001).   The upshot, in GPN, is a greater appreciation of the complex 
interdependencies between the dimensions of embeddedness, power and value and the 
unique spatiality of each production network (Henderson et al, 2002).  
 While the relationship between power and the capture value have been studied 
extensively (see, for example, Bowles et al, 1999), the notion of ‘embeddedness’ has 
somewhat nebulously combined linear, buyer-supplier, cluster and territorial relations, 
stimulating recent discussion of ‘who’ exactly is embedded in ‘what’ (Hess, 2004).  
This framing of the question, to my mind, constructs embeddedness as an inert 
characteristic of network actors rather than as an active relational process.  Moreover, 
thanks to the journalists ‘embedded’ in Iraq, the term itself is identified increasingly as 
an obfuscating ‘weasel word’ of management-speak (Watson, 2004).  To overcome 
these failings, an adequate theorization of embedded relations must acknowledge the 
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dynamic, uneven and spatialised character of relations and accommodate their multiple 
aspects: the relationships of networks actors with each other, the relationships of each 
actor to the network as a whole, and relationships of the network to host territories or 
broader contextual circumstances.  To date, examinations of network relationships have 
tended to privilege the micro scale, focusing on the interpersonal ties created and 
expressed by trust, cooperation and mutual advantage (Granovetter, 1985; Grabher, 
2002; Uzzi, 1997), while paying less attention to the interests of sub-groups within 
networks or the range of influences with effects at scales other than the interpersonal.  
Moreover, the interpersonal focus has drawn attention away from the multi-dimensional 
operation of power, the manner in which network formations are shaped by policy 
frameworks, the imperatives of capitalist markets and the reflexively contingent impacts 
of the changing geopolitical and regulatory contexts.  An adequate definition of 
embeddedness must appreciate the uneven and shifting character of embedded relations 
at multiple scales: that actors are engaged simultaneously in multiple (and sometimes 
competing) personal, organizational, territorial and political associations.   
 The tentative framework for understanding embedded relationships developed in 
Table 1 incorporates the interdependencies between different types and scales of 
‘embedded’ relations. In contrast to Henderson et al (2002), embeddedness is 
conceptualised as a quality produced by relationships of trust and asymmetries of 
power.  Its multi-dimensional nature is explained below before being applied to case of 
the Fiji-Australia garment production system. 
 
< Put Table 1 about here> 
 
 In general, the term embeddedness describes the multiple social, cultural, 
economic, political, historical and personal relationships that situate actors in networks, 
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regions, and social groups.  Zukin and DiMaggio (1990) define four dimensions of 
embedded associations – cognitive, cultural, structural and political embeddedness.  
Cognitive embeddedness is based on bounded rationality and place-based knowledge. It 
is associated with proximity, although it might also describe the links that develop 
between groups of actors with similar ideological motivations.   Cultural embeddedness 
has a place- or group-specific flavour, and is derived from collective understandings of 
the way things are done. It enables recognition of ‘out-of-placeness’ ― as in the 
situation of Australian expatriate managers in Fiji.  Structural embeddedness is 
generated through the incorporation of economic, social and cultural relations. It 
includes embeddedness in the regulatory and institutional networks that frame the 
operations of production systems.  Finally, political embeddedness identifies 
relationships of actors and networks frameworks to rule-making powers and actors.  The 
multiple aspects of embeddedness overlap considerably, with varying relevance, weight, 
scale and scope.  
 Partitioning embeddedness highlights its variability and sensitivity to context. 
Envisioning complex webs of ‘embedded’ associations, rather that a static state of 
‘embeddedness’ opens the way to injecting the missing link of dynamism into its 
conceptualisation.  Changes in contextual conditions will have an uneven impact - 
reframing some associations but barely influencing others - depending on the form and 
depth of embedded relations and each actor’s position relative to others.  If embedded 
relationships are conceived as processes rather than things, then understanding their 
dynamics requires fleshing out the nature of relations at different scales and in different 
contexts.   Embeddedness can then be animated, recasting it to describe firms’ and 
actors’ shifting allegiances.   
 Thinking of embeddedness in terms of allegiances draws attention to the notion 
of trust.  Trust involves both an agent's acceptance of risk arising from the actions of 
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others, and the expectation that the partner will not take advantage of the opportunities 
opened up by that acceptance (Humphrey and Schmitz 1998:31).  Trust is here 
conceived as a relational commodity produced actively in and by network interactions, 
where its multiple meanings and effects are intertwined with social relations, cultural 
expectations and inter-firm power differentials.  Like embeddedness, trust adopts a 
variety of guises and operates at multiple scales.  Zucker (1986) defines three modes of 
trust. First, process-based trust is a micro-level form created and reinforced in personal 
interactions. It builds over time through repeated exchanges. Second, characteristic-
based trust operates at the meso-level where it parallels the group associations and 
cultural commonalities best known to geographers through the concept of guanxi (see 
Hsu and Saxenian, 2002).  Third, institutionally-based trust emerges in complex 
systems at the macro scale, where it describes actors’ faith in risk-reducing regulatory 
structures, rules and contractual arrangements.  This impersonal form of trust emerges 
where there is a significant social distance between actors, when exchanges take place 
across extensive geographical distance, and when repeated exchanges involve ‘non-
separable’ elements.  Institutional trust is therefore related intimately to the concept of 
risk.  Zucker (1986:67) emphasises the context-specific nature of trust-creation 
processes: for example, self-interested behaviour might promote trust in a bank 
transaction but have the opposite effect at a school working bee.   
 Trust is intertwined with power.  In global production networks, as different 
forms of trust operate simultaneously to create mutually reinforcing webs, they also 
generate asymmetries that reflect actors’ different capacities to respond to unanticipated 
events.  In practice, it is not always possible to separate trust from power concealed by 
dependency or manipulation (Bieir, 1994; Hardy et al, 1998; Sydow, 1998).  Micro-
level dyad relationships between individuals and firms – as articulated in interactions 
based on trust, cooperation, suspicion or coercion – can be viewed, therefore, as 
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context-bound expressions of underlying structural power relations.  Exploring 
asymmetries of power and their spatial expressions – what Allen (2003) has called 
‘spatial assemblages of power’ – is crucial to comprehending the embedded nature of 
network relations.  Networks are socio-spatial relations inscribed by geometries of 
power (Dicken et al 2001:92; Massey 1993; Taylor, 2002), but specifying the operation 
of power is difficult given its multiple expressions and multiple effects.  In parallel with 
trust, power must be defined in relational terms, where its intensities and effects vary 
with actors’ positions in the network, with scale, and with context. An adequate concept 
of power must incorporate both capacity, as the ‘power to …’, and its exercise, since 
abstract structural powers may exist in latent form and be realised only in particular 
contexts or contingencies.  Firm power may be deployed to many ends, but in market 
capitalism, the capture of surplus is a primary aim.   
 Scale embodies and expresses power-laden processes of hierarchisation and 
ordering (Brenner 2001:600; Swyngedouw 2000).  At the micro-level, power is a 
resource exercised through the minutiae of everyday interactions (Ettlinger 2003); for 
example, in price bargaining or in the control of information.  At the meso level, within 
networks, power may be expressed as the ability to build network cohesion, to capture 
the benefit of innovations, to exclude others, to insist others act in certain ways, or to 
withdraw (see Allen, 2000; Mann, 1986; Strange 1996).  At the macro-level, power can 
be discerned in the capacity to influence wider geo-political events or create an 
advantageous regulatory framework. At each scale, knowledge enhances the capacity to 
exercise power and enables access to new knowledge (Bryson et al, 2000).  The inter-
relations between embeddedness, trust, power and knowledge are illuminated by 
examining the impact of the 2000 crisis in Fiji 
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The Fiji Australia Production Network 
At the outset, this case study of the Fiji-Australia production network aimed to 
illuminate the different characteristics of ‘network’ and ‘territorial’ embeddedness.  To 
that end, the empirical research sought to identify constituent actors in the Fiji-Australia 
production network, comprehend their ongoing relationships and specify the structural 
outcomes of their interactions. The 2000 coup d’etat interrupted the research program 
but provided an unexpected opportunity to explore changing network forms. Following 
Dicken et al (2001), the study’s relational methodology included: (i) recognition of the 
discursive power of analytical categories to shape material processes; (ii) appreciation 
of the need to incorporate multiple scales of economic, political, social and cultural 
relations in a manner that recognises the contemporary relativisation of scale; (iii) 
commitment to eschew privileging any one organisation or site, and (iv) awareness of 
the danger of overgeneralising from specific cases.  In the small and relatively simple 
structure of the Fiji-Australia garment production network, constituent firms were 
embedded, with minimal overlap, in vertical trans-national value-adding relationships 
and horizontal territorial relationships in either Australia or Fiji.  This clear separation 
of roles made it possible to unpack the network’s relational geometry, reveal its 
heterogenous relations of power, and assess their diverse effects.   Fieldwork included 
semi-structured interviews with each of Fiji’s major garment producers. Seventeen 
interviews were conducted in September 2001, a little more than a year after the coup, 
at a time when the future of the Fiji garment industry appeared bleak. The interviews 
targeted major suppliers to the Australian market and interrogated how changing geo-
political and regulatory conditions realigned relationships.  The next section sets the 
scene by describing the relational configuration of inter-firm networks in the years 
before the coup. 
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Geo-political Context 
While Australia and Fiji shared a long association derived from their common histories 
as members of the British Commonwealth, their relationship was changing in the 1980s 
as neo-liberal political and economic policies gained ascendency in both nations.  In 
Fiji, the 1987 Rabuka coup had installed a neo-liberal policy regime that embraced a 
development strategy based on garment-led Export Oriented Industrialisation (EOI) 
(Robertson, 1995; World Bank, 1995; see also Denoon and Wyndham, 1999).   
Australia’s currency float in 1987 marked the beginning of a similar policy re-
orientation (Webber and Weller 2001).  At about the same time, Australia began 
disengaging from its paternalistic involvement in the South Pacific.1   
 Paradoxically, in this overall context of advancing neo-liberalism, the Fiji-
Australia garment production network was created by bringing together three 
complementary interventionist regulatory initiatives. At the regional scale, the 1982 aid-
motivated and non-reciprocal South Pacific Regional Trade and Economic Cooperation 
Agreement (SPARTECA) enabled Fiji firms to export goods to Australia free of duty, 
subject to detailed rules of origin (see Grynberg, 1998).  In 1987, as part of its EOI 
strategy, Fiji introduced a Tax Free Factory/Tax Free Zone (TFF/TFZ) Scheme that 
provided 13-year tax exemptions for factories able to export 95% of production.  The 
Scheme aimed primarily to create jobs and reduce government welfare spending (Taylor 
2002), but consistent with its Washington Consensus motivation, also permitted the 
unrestricted repatriation of profits out of Fiji (Long 1990:102).  Meanwhile, in 1992, 
                                                 
1 Tickell and Peck (2003:180) view such disengagement as an aspect of ‘deep neo-
liberalization’ 
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Australia established an export subsidy scheme, the Import Credit Scheme (ICS), to 
encourage exports of Australian textiles.  
 The combination of SPARTECA, TFF/TFZ and ICS brought Australian textiles 
firms to Fiji, where their fabric was cut and sewn by contractors operating in tax-free 
factories. Finished garments were then imported back to Australia duty free under 
SPARTECA. The combination of policy incentives created a de-facto Offshore 
Processing Trade (OPT) system (Weller, 2000a).  Its three-fold benefits stimulated the 
Fiji sector’s rapid expansion in the 1990s.2   Figure 1 shows the exponential growth in 
Fiji’s clothing exports between 1986 and 1997 and demonstrates the increasing 
importance of the Australian market (and therefore the associated Australia-Fiji 
production network). By 1999, the garment sector in Fiji employed 18,000 people, 
accounted for 28 per cent of Fiji’s gross domestic exports and constituted 3.5 percent of 
Fiji’s Gross Domestic Product (Singh, 1999).   The resulting sectoral network was small 
and concentrated, with the 20 largest firms producing 75% of Fiji’s output (Cawthorne 
and Weller, 2004).   
 
<put Figure 1 about here> 
   
 Fiji production blossomed at a time of crisis in the Australian garment industry.  
Motivated by comparative advantage arguments and the objective of opening markets 
for agricultural exports, Australia had adopted a ‘free trade’ policy orientation in the late 
1980s.  As a result, Australia’s garment-related liberalisations far exceeded those 
                                                 
2 An Australian official confided in retrospect that the Fiji garment industry was an ‘unintended 
outcome’ of Australia’s ICS provisions (pers. comm. 2001). 
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required by the World Trade Organisation’s Agreement on Textiles and Clothing.3   All 
garment import quotas had been abolished by 1993, while tariff duties were reduced 
progressively throughout the 1990s.  With rapid exposure to international competition, 
the Australian garment production industry declined relentlessly throughout the 1990s 
(Webber and Weller, 2001; 2002). Australian firms relocating to Fiji included former 
manufacturers seeking to reduce production costs, wholesalers purchasing from Fiji 
independent firms, and retailers switching their dedicated sourcing to Fiji-based 
subcontractors (Weller 2000a). Given the interplay of costs, fashion cycles and 
turnaround times, Fiji production for the Australian market developed a specialisation in 
medium-to-low fashion menswear, workwear, jeans and surfwear.  
Territorial Embeddedness in Fiji 
The transnational production network created by the web of intersecting regulations was 
organised to maximise the gains that could be extracted from different subsidies (Weller 
2000a).  The socio-spatial configuration of garment production in Fiji expressed firms’ 
different forms of engagement with offshore garment production networks, their 
relationships to the web of government regulations and incentives, their target markets, 
sources of capital and forms of governance (see Figure 2).   
 
<Put Figure 2 about here> 
 
The sector’s geographical configuration reflected firms’ political, social and cultural 
allegiances.  The offshore production plants of Australian and New Zealand 
manufacturing firms and the branch-plants of Asian clothing production conglomerates 
                                                 
3  Australia was not a signatory to the later versions of the Multi-Fibre Arrangement.  
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(which manufactured primarily for the US market under Multi-Fibre Agreement quota 
arrangements) were located to the north-west of Fiji’s main island (Viti Levu), close to 
the international sea and air ports. The branch-plants to the west were weakly embedded 
territorially.  In contrast, Fiji’s independent export-oriented sector, which supplied 
Australia- and New Zealand-based retailers and wholesalers, was located to the south-
east, on the outskirts of Fiji’s political and administrative capital, Suva.  A few 
entrepreneurial families with multiple business interests dominated this sector.  As 
leaders in the local Indo-Fijian community, they derived social power from their ability 
to mobilise extended family networks and to access the labour of Indo-Fijian women 
(Slatter, 1991). They also enjoyed close links to the ethnic Fijian ruling elite.  
Nevertheless, some of held Australian (or New Zealand) citizenship and had financial 
interests in multiple locations external to Fiji.  The problematic status of Indo-Fijians in 
Fiji society, the permeability of Fiji’s borders to capital flows and the transnational 
aspirations of the garment sector’s principal actors combined to blur the ‘territorial’ 
embeddedness of Fiji’s independent garment sector.   
 Nonetheless, a combination of implicit and explicit collaborations embedded 
firms into a local network where complementary specialisations, production-based 
cooperation, shared forms of social engagement with buyers and unified political 
objectives generated multiple untraded dependencies (Storper 1995).  Firms routinely 
borrowed trims and machinery from each other, passed on work when overloaded, 
borrowed workers, and generally helped each other out when delays interrupted the 
delivery of inputs from New Zealand and Australia. Day-to-day inter-firm cooperation 
supported the Fiji industry against the disadvantages of its isolated location.   
 Firms specialised individually and collectively to accommodate their offshore 
clients’ specific supply needs.  An informal referral system developed to introduce 
buyers to complementary makers (since Fiji’s small sector did not support 
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intermediaries).  Providing a choice of makers for most garment types discouraged 
buyers from seeking alternative production locations and enabled the Fiji industry to 
adjust production volumes to variations in demand.  Producers understood that ‘locking 
in’ buyer firms to Fiji suppliers would reduce their collective vulnerability: 
 
We are doing everything to lock them in … so they are comfortable in 
dealing with us … so there’s no reason for them to look elsewhere 
(Interview F16). 
 
The possibility that ‘lock-in’ could have negative effects – by stifling innovation or 
limiting strategic options – was not entertained.  Tacit acknowledgement of a shared 
reputation limited the extent to which Fiji firms competed with each other:  
 
Here there are no competitors here.  Everyone is linked together.  
Everyone refers work to each other (Interview F2). 
 
In a context where the failure of any one firm would reflect poorly on others, the Fiji 
territorial network produced a high degree of ‘characteristic-based’ trust and cognitive 
embeddedness.  
 Fiji firms also cooperated politically ― through organisations such as the 
Textiles Clothing and Footwear (TCF) Council of Fiji and the Fiji-Australia Business 
Council ― to maintain profitable national and transnational policies.  Garment 
entrepreneurs supported Fiji’s Export Oriented Industrialisation strategy and viewed 
their interests as synonymous with Fiji’s prosperity (TSRR 2001). In the years before 
the 2000 coup, the sector’s considerable influence on policy formulation testified to its 
political power and political embeddedness. However, not all Fijian firms were 
‘embedded’ in the politics of the production system to the same degree.  The branch 
plants in the western sector cooperated with collective political activities, but with less 
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vigour than independent firms in the east.  Moreover, their managers were less closely 
embedded in Indo-Fijian social and cultural networks.   
 To summarise: the locally-based social and political power of Fiji garment 
entrepreneurs was sustained by supportive institutions at the national and supranational 
scales which created a territorial network featuring multiple cooperative 
interdependencies.  The extent and nature of firms’ embeddedness reflected a complex 
mix of territorially contingent allegiances that were grounded in both cultural and 
business linkages. The resulting ‘cluster’ developed a form of self-regulation that 
dampened competition between firms while promoting their collective competitiveness.    
The local sector’s shared conventions, routines, values and expectations are 
characteristic of industrial clustering in its ‘developing country’ form (Humphrey 1995).  
Embeddedness and the Value Chain  
Transnational network links had a quite different character. High levels of cooperation 
between Australian textiles firms, Fiji manufacturers and Australian garment buyers 
firms created dense collaborative transnational networks dedicated to maximizing the 
gains from the regulatory framework (ICS, the TFF/TFZ and SPARTECA).  Multiple 
cross-border inter-dependencies developed as firms manipulated prices, inputs and 
production costs to meet SPARTECA’s rules of origin, which demanded (initially) that 
at least 50% of final value be added in Fiji. These relationships were underpinned by 
trust in regulatory frameworks and institutions, and were supported by cooperative 
relationships at the interfirm and interpersonal levels.  
 In their transnational relations, Fiji firms focused on building and consolidating 
collaborative associations.  From a Fijian perspective, transnational relationships were 
framed by trust, which was defined in this context as an interpersonal quality 
established through repeated engagements and social interactions (shared meals and 
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scuba-diving trips, for example). Trust – in this ‘process-based’ form – is what locks 
buyers into the network:  
 
We are like a family now (Interview F12). 
 
The Fijian definition of trust was grounded in the expectation that business agreements 
would produce fair outcomes based on the principle of mutual advantage, where losses 
arising from unforeseen errors or events would be shared.  From this perspective, trust 
signifies a commitment to share risks across the network.  This definition diverges from  
idea of trust found commonly in the business literature, where trust describes reliable 
performance and reputation, conditioned by the principal of mutual advantage (Brown 
and Duguid 2000).  The difference echoes Ettlinger’s (2003) distinction between trust as 
‘emotive’ feeling and trust as ‘capacity’ to perform. In practice, the Fijian interpretation 
of trust resulted in transnational business being conducted on the basis of gentlemen’s 
agreements, where details were either not written down or were written in a generalised 
form. Written contracts, it seems, represented a demonstration of mistrust, but their 
absence created a fluidity that blurred the allocation of responsibilities and risks. 
  Transaction cost-based theories view interpersonal trust as positive attribute that 
increase the efficiency of inter-firm interactions (Uzzi 1997).  Yet in Fiji, strategies 
directed to the production of trust generated a plethora of economic inefficiencies as 
social rituals developed to build relationships, relax business interactions, and 
ultimately create network- and territory-based ‘lock-in’.  Fiji firms supported one 
another by enticing buyers to spend more time and money in Fiji, confident that an 
extended stay in paradise would break down buyers’ business orientation and lead to 
better outcomes for Fiji firms.    
 The emphasis on personal trustworthiness at the micro-level complemented a 
discourse constructing low business risk as the core of Fiji’s competitive advantage.  
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Fiji firms frequently described their advantage over other production locations in terms 
of quality and reliability: manufacturers in Fiji could reproduce faithfully not just 
written design specifications, but also buyers’ design intentions.  Culturally-based 
misinterpretations or mistakes arising from language differences were rare: 
 
The good thing about Fiji [as a manufacturing site] is that we know their 
cultures.  When you call the designer you know who you are talking to.  You 
don’t know in China ... and that makes buyers nervous (Interview F2). 
 
The other side of this coin was that Fiji firms were less enthusiastic about taking 
responsibility for the inherent risks of clothing’s unstable consumer markets.  In Fiji’s 
in Cut-Make-Trim production, offshore buyers provided designs, fabrics and trims, 
while Fiji manufacturers focussed on improving service efficiency: 
 
They choose the fabric.  I don’t want to choose the fabric.  If anything goes 
wrong I can get a big claim.  I don’t want to take any risks: if the quality of 
the fabric is not good, it’s their responsibility not mine (Interview F12).   
 
Contradicting the notion that trust implied shared risk, the consumer market risks of 
fashion mistakes remained the buyers’ responsibility.    
 In this context, the relationship between trust, knowledge and network 
embeddedness was problematic.  Production-related knowledge flowed freely along the 
supply chain.  Buyer firms provided Fiji contractors with new machinery, training and 
information about production technologies: codified ‘catch-up’ knowledge that 
translated directly into quality improvement and assisted Fiji firms to maintain global 
production standards.  At the same time, buyers did not offer information about the 
consumer market or consumer trends, nor did Fiji firms seek such knowledge:  
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We try to keep away from design ... most [buyer] companies feel 
comfortable if they control the design part (Interview F2). 
 
Thus, notions of trust, risk and responsibility were tied complexly to understandings of 
the boundaries of network interactions – of what was and was not legitimately part of 
Fiji firms’ scope of interest. 
 Disinterest in design betrayed a tacit agreement that suppliers would not compete 
with buyer firms. Independent design capability in Fiji was perceived as signalling to 
buyers a potential to copy original designs, which, firms believed, would have created 
mistrust in inter-firm relationships.  Learning via vertical cross-border flows was 
limited to knowledge relevant to the fabrication process and identifying the 
opportunities arising from the regulations that underpinned the transnational  network.  
Meanwhile, the imperative to maintain institutional ‘trust’ effectively inhibited the 
transmission of crucially important knowledge about fashion and garment markets.   
The reality of restricted knowledge flows in the context of close cooperative relations 
contradicts the literature of agglomeration and local learning, where trust is valued 
because it lubricates interactions, improves the fluidity of knowledge flows and 
stimulates the developmental benefits of regional innovation (Humphrey and Schmitz, 
1998; Lundvall, 1988; Gereffi 1999).  
 Firms’ bargaining positions in price negotiations are also an important indicator 
of the nature of relationships (Cool et al 1989).  Here, trust intersects with economic 
power. In buyer-seller interactions, the common objective of coordinating gains from 
the manipulation of regulations produced an unusually high degree of cross-border price 
transparency as fabric prices and labour costs became part of the shared knowledge 
base.  According to Uzzi (1997), sharing such information strengthens inter-firm bonds 
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and extends firms’ range of strategic options.  In Fiji, the upshot was that factory 
margins, calculated as a percentage of production costs, became the basis of price 
negotiations:  
 
We don’t see their market costs and aren’t that interested.  We work out that 
this garment is going to take 20 minutes and cost me $3.00 a piece.  So I 
know what money I am going to make.  ...  We have learned how much 
mark-up [to add] in order to have a mutual situation (Interview F11).  
 
Buyers’ and sellers’ different depths of knowledge of consumer preferences and the 
market prices of finished goods meant that price negotiations were framed by different 
cognitions of the relationship between price and value.  In this context – where 
Australian buyers and Fiji sellers did not share ‘cognitive’ embeddedness despite their 
multiple cooperative links – asymmetrical knowledge generated asymmetrical 
bargaining positions, and therefore asymmetrical capacities (powers) to capture surplus.  
Under relentless price pressure from buyer firms, the profit rate of Fiji firms declined 
progressively through the early 1990s (Figure 3). Fiji firms’ weak bargaining position 
and lack of knowledge of garment markets contributed to immiserising growth 
(Prebisch 1950).  
 
<put Figure 3 about here> 
  
 To sum up: in transnational interactions, Fiji manufacturers routinely made 
credible commitments that would consolidate their relationships with buyers, while 
buyers made significant investments to secure product quality and supplier loyalty.  At 
the same time, however, buyers retained the power to limit flows of knowledge and 
resources.  The network’s established routines and practices reduced information and 
search costs, but defined simultaneously Fiji firms’ subordinate role and structured 
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incapacity for innovation. Nonetheless, because the network remained open and 
cooperative in order to exploit regulatory incentives, it deviated from the ‘quasi-
hierarchical’ form common to cut-make-trim production in developing countries (see 
Humphrey and Schmitz 2002).   
 Transnational network links were underpinned at the macro level by 
‘institutional’ trust in the regulatory framework; at the meso level by Fiji’s low risk 
reputation, its local collaborations and local stocks of ‘characteristic-based’ trust; while 
the active production of ‘process-based’ interpersonal trust at the micro level glued 
transnational bonds. However, Fiji’s deployment of the notion of trust, which sought to 
spread risks but not responsibilities combined with a narrow boundary of interest to 
maintain subordinate relationships relative to buyers.  However, concluding that buyers, 
as risk-bearers, had a ‘right’ to reap the reward of surplus value ignores the reality that 
the capacity for accumulation in this network was underwritten by regulation (see Lee 
2003).    
The Crisis of May 2000 
While the Australia-Fiji garment network displayed many of the features of a functional 
cluster, the appearance of equalities between firms concealed underlying differences in 
capacities that were not revealed until geo-political crisis intervened to disrupt network 
stability.  Before the coup in May 2000, relationships in the transnational buyer-supplier 
dimension differed in character to the relationships in the local Fiji production cluster.  
Although both sets of relationships were ‘cooperatively’ embedded, further examination 
revealed their embeddedness to be based on different expressions of trust, different 
bases of knowledge and different geometries of power.  It is not surprising, then, that 
crisis produced uneven impacts, altering some relationship but not others. 
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Precursors to Crisis 
Fiji’s May 2000 coup d’etat altered the garment production network decisively as 
Australian buyer firms either withdrew from Fiji or dramatically reduced their Fiji 
production volumes.  The effect was devastating: Fiji’s garment sector workforce fell 
from 18,000 to about 13,500 workers between May 2000 and May 2001.  In the 2000-
2001 financial year, the Fiji Reserve Bank expected that garment production would fall 
by 10–20%, and that garment export earnings would fall by 40% from $F304.7 million 
to $F184.5 million (RBF, 2001).  The coup marked the culmination of a growing 
regulatory, economic and political crisis.  
 In Fiji, the deficiencies of the EOI strategy were becoming clear. The garment 
export sector had not delivered national prosperity, nor had it developed a deep 
economic embeddedness in the Fiji economy.  Only 20% of the sector’s inputs were 
sourced locally and garment production had generated few opportunities for 
complementary local development (Narayan, 1999; Taylor, 2002).  To meet 
SPARTECA rules of origin, firms had colluded to inflate Fiji value-adding, which had 
the effect of discouraging local productivity improvement and dampening ‘sunk’ 
investments in Fiji:  rent on premises, for example, could be included in local 
production content, but capital works could not (Grynberg, 1998).  The failure to secure 
significant ‘trickle down’ community benefits through taxation, infrastructure or wage 
income for workers fuelled local political opposition.  In addition, the sector’s record of 
poor wages and Dickensian working conditions generated international criticism from 
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NGOs and aid agencies.4   Narayan (1999) estimated that the loss of export garment 
sector would produce only a 1.2% decline in Fiji’s GDP.    
 In 1999, a change in Fiji’s political complexion put the EOI strategy and the 
garment production industry on notice. It also diminished the political influence of Fiji’s 
garment entrepreneurs.  The new-elected social democratic Chaudhry government – 
Fiji’s first Indo-Fijian government  – was committed to increasing the community 
benefits accruing from garment production, to increasing garment workers’ wages, and 
to levying taxes on clothing firms after their TFF/TFZ Scheme tax exemption expired 
(Prasad, 1999; Singh 1999).5  The Opposition to the Chaudhry administration – which 
culminated ultimately in the coup – arose from dissatisfactions in the Fiji business 
sector at least as much as from communal rivalries (MacLellan 2001).  These local 
political developments altered the nature of the Fiji production network’s political 
embeddedness and tested long-standing intra-network associations.  
  The transnational regulatory framework was also changing rapidly.  Australia’s 
Import Credit Scheme had contravened the WTO’s prohibition of export subsidies and 
was being phased out. After its scheduled termination in 2000, there would be less 
incentive for Australian firms to manufacture garments in Fiji.  Continuing trade barrier 
liberalisation in Australia had forced many former manufacturing firms to close down 
or restructure as importers of finished garments (Webber and Weller 2001).  In addition, 
Australian garment and textiles firms had become isolated politically as both major 
                                                 
4 Working conditions in the garment sector had attracted international attention in the late 
1990s, culminating in a United Nations report critical of Fiji’s wage levels and labour 
conditions (ICFTU 1997).  
5  Nonetheless, at the time of the coup, the incoming administration had not yet implemented its 
election promise to increase garment workers’ wages. 
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political parties pursued anti-protectionist policies.  In addition, the competitive position 
of Fiji exports was also deteriorating.  The advantage of SPARTECA’s duty exemption 
was declining as Australia reduced duty rates on imports from other places, ‘derogation’ 
arrangements that had relaxed temporarily SPARTECA’s local content requirements 
were due to expire in 2000, and appreciation of the Fiji dollar was undermining its 
export industries.  For firms in this network, accumulation based on the exploitation of 
overlapping industry policy incentives was clearly under threat. 
The Impact of Crisis 
The coup nonetheless provided the catalyst for momentous change. Direct impacts on 
production were relatively minor in the short term. Although intermittent power 
supplies and curfew-induced absenteeism inconvenienced businesses in the Suva area, 
there were few disruptions on the west of the island.  Still, Australian trade union bans 
interrupted deliveries across Fiji, forcing firms to charter aircraft to fulfil their 
obligations.  Over the next year, however, the coup’s deeper impact emerged.  
Outcomes varied between sub-sectors depending on their patterns of internal and 
external embeddedness. Three quite distinct sets of effects emerged (Figure 4).   
 
[Put figure 4 about here] 
 
 First, the offshore branch plants of Australian firms simply closed down 
(Cawthorne and Weller 2004). Most of these firms had been established to exploit 
regulatory incentives and had only weak political, social or cultural embeddedness in 
Fiji.  When ‘shallow’ capital left them exposed in the crisis, their parent firms either 
exited the industry or switched to cheaper production sites (and probably would have 
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done so even if the coup had not occurred).6  Second, factories supplying the US market 
through Asian parent firms were largely unaffected by the coup and associated events, 
demonstrating that despite their ‘weak’ embeddedness in Fiji, the advantage of quota 
access to the US market was more important in the short term than local risk. These 
factories were also distant from local social and political events, and they were not 
affected by changes to SPARTECA and the ICS.  Third, factories in the ‘independent’ 
Fiji export sector, which relied on orders from multiple, mainly Australian and New 
Zealand buyers, experienced a serious downturn.  Fourth, the small number of Fijian 
contractors that had worked the edges of the network supplying extra capacity at times 
of peak demand quickly exited the industry as their work disappeared.  Events in Fiji 
undoubtedly threatened the accumulation of capital, but the patterns of outcomes 
suggest that the coup was less important to business than the altered conditions of trade 
brought on by regulatory changes.   
Trust, Power and Network Re-Configuration 
By September 2001, Fiji entrepreneurs struggled to survive as garment orders declined 
by perhaps 50% compared to the previous year. As Fiji firms saw it, buyer withdrawal 
reflected perceptions of increased business risk:   
  
Customers were pissed off ... so frustrated ... it carried on and carried on.  It was 
frustrating for them because they only care about their business, about the 
delivery time (Interview F2). 
 
                                                 
6 At the peak of the crisis, the Reserve Bank of Fiji had requested that banks restrict lending to 
preserve Fiji’s capital stocks.  After the coup, banks in Fiji tightened controls on overdrafts and 
limited access to the Fiji Export Finance Facility.     
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Buyer firms either exited Fiji production or reduced their orders to a minimum, 
retaining the option of increasing production if and when conditions improved.  The 
network configuration altered with changing expressions of trust, different uses of 
knowledge, and the overt exercise of powers that had been hidden from view in the 
years of stable accumulation.  
 The first basis of trust – faith in the institutional framework and Fiji’s ‘low risk’ 
production – was seriously compromised despite the fact that the Fiji firms met their 
current business obligations.  The second basis of trust – lack of written detail of 
contractual obligations – operated to the disadvantage of Fiji firms as buyers cancelled 
long-standing verbal agreements by simply replacing the personnel liaising with Fiji 
suppliers.  The change in line-up also obliterated the third basis of trust, the ‘process-
based’ interpersonal trust that had been nurtured in repeated interactions over the years. 
The fourth basis trust – the expectation that firms would share losses from unforeseen 
circumstances – had no currency in the post-coup environment.  Fiji’s interpersonal 
understanding of trust had created the illusion that loyalty would extend through 
adversity, when in reality ‘trust’ switched rapidly to distrust when the suspicion arose 
that ‘the disruption of expectations in one exchange is likely to generalise to other 
transactions’ (Zucker 1986:59).  After the crisis, ‘trust’ took on a market orientation 
‘underpinned by no assumptions of loyalty beyond what self-interest requires’ 
(Humphrey and Schmitz 2002:530; see also Sayer 2002).   In contrast, the 
‘characteristic-based’ shared by Indo-Fijian entrepreneurs, which was grounded in 
social and cultural commonalities (but did not necessarily imply inter-personal 
goodwill), was not compromised by the crisis.  Changes in relations of ‘trust’ highlight 
the difference between trust relationships based in economic rather than social or 
cultural associations.   
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 After the coup, asymmetrical knowledge resources empowered buyer firms.  
Price transparency in buyer-seller interactions – the mainstay of pre-coup cooperation – 
was reframed from a shared knowledge resource to a power operating to the buyer’s 
advantage.  Remaining buyers used their knowledge of production costs in Fiji to force 
down prices: 
 
[E]verything has ... forced the situation.  Its coming down to bargaining but 
my margins are diminishing.  Now I have stopped negotiating prices because 
the negotiations inevitably involve [unpleasant] compromises (Interview F4). 
 
As buyers were well aware, Fiji’s CMT factories were organised for volume production 
and not financed to withstand long periods of operation at below break-even capacity. 
Sellers had little option but to cut margins as they struggled to maintain production 
volumes.    
 As increased risk exposed latent power inequities, the relationships in the 
remnant network re-configured.  The cooperative relationships that characterised the 
pre-coup era were replaced, at the instigation of buyers and in conjunction with 
personnel changes, by hierarchical ‘arms-length’ encounters.  The central control over 
this shift was the collapse of the network’s supportive regulatory framework, the 
collapse of institutional trust, and buyer firms’ consequent perceptions of heightened 
risk.   
 After the coup, the continuing viability of the production network relied on the 
re-establishment of a stable regulatory context that would reduce business risk.  Both 
Australia-based and Fiji-based firms lobbied the Australian government vigorously, but 
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Australia refused to enter negotiations until ‘democracy’ had been restored in Fiji.7 
Australia’s neo-liberal policy orientation effectively precluded political solutions that 
did not meet national commercial advantage criteria.8  When Australia did eventually 
establish a WTO-admissible offshore processing scheme to replace the ICS, its 
guidelines did not provide preferential assess for Fiji production (Pearson 2000).   
 The transnational network was no longer sufficiently powerful to secure the 
political support necessary to underwrite continued accumulation.   Thus, and in 
contrast to the cross-border production networks created under NAFTA and within the 
EC, the Australia-Fiji production network had become estranged from national loci of 
power in both national contexts.   This weakened political embeddedness was both a 
cause and an outcome of the network’s decline. In contrast to other high wage countries, 
Australia’s agriculture- and resources-oriented policymakers shunned the creation of 
cross-border garment production networks.9   By the end of 2000, as a direct 
consequence of these events, Australia’s three largest fabric producers (National 
Textiles, Bradmill Industries and Austrim) faced insolvency (Weller, 2000a; 2000b).     
 The coup also highlighted the link between network embeddedness and regional 
development in Fiji.  It heightened awareness of the structural dependencies inherent in 
Cut-Make-Trim production:  
                                                 
7 The coup also represented a rejection of Fiji’s new Constitution which effectively 
diminished ethnic Fijian representation. 
8 The events of 9/11 in the United States have since rekindled Australian interest in the 
security advantages of cooperation in the South Pacific. 
9  This reflects the dominance of comparative advantage arguments and the resulting 
focus on agricultural and resource exports. Weller (2000a) discusses of the implications 
of Australia’s island geography for OPT. 
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 CMT was a problem for us because our destiny was dictated by our customer 
(Interview F11).  
     
However, as Cut-Make-Trim operation came to be viewed as a liability, and as Fiji 
firms sought to upgrade to a new, higher level of accumulation, their capacities to 
restructure were limited by the pre-coup bargain that had restricted access to fashion 
and design knowledge. The conventions, shared business practices and credible 
commitments that developed to promote successful CMT business relationships 
constrained Fiji firms’ ability to transform their production to independent Original 
Equipment Manufacture (OEM).   
Implications for GPN Theory 
The uneven pattern of post-coup effects highlights firms’ diverse allegiances and the 
extent to which embeddedness is complexly intertwined with regulatory frameworks, 
markets, inter-firm relationships, social connections and historical bonds.  Firms’ 
reactions to the coup depended on their perceptions of risk, the perceived dimensions of 
trust, the depth and scope of knowledge, and the realities of economic power 
differentials between buyers and sellers.   Response options were conditioned by firms’ 
degree and types of embeddedness in Fiji-based production.  Firms’ uneven capacities 
to alter position in their multiple networks highlights the complex, multifaceted and 
dynamic nature of ‘embedded’ relations.  These opposing impacts underscore the 
continued utility of distinguishing ‘horizontal’ peer relations from ‘vertical’ supply 
chain relationships, and rekindle awareness of the differences in strategic options of 
larger and smaller (capital rich and capital poor) firms.   To generalise from this 
example: 
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• Firms that disconnected completely from networks in crisis are those most reliant 
on regulatory supports, the least strongly linked territorially, and were smaller 
firms with weaker capital resources.  Network disconnection follows the 
collapse of trust in the institutional framework, but is also associated also with 
power: in the capacity (or incapacity) to withdraw. The strategies of exiting 
buyers are consistent with the game theoretic expectation that selfish players 
will defect from cooperation when the endgame is played, even if close ties 
existed previously (Celly et al 1999).     
• Geo-political change reconfigures transnational attachments.   Crisis exposes the 
power and knowledge differences and empowers buyers over sellers. Larger 
buyer firms with sufficient economic power to have a strategic choice prefer to 
maintain associations but under altered rules of engagement.  As risks increase, 
buyer firms jettison or downgrade long-standing trust-based relationships. In 
contrast to Humphrey and Schmitz (2002), inter-firm relationships do not rest on 
a continuum where trust and cooperation build incrementally.  When the context 
becomes unpredictable, relationships switch gears quickly and decisively.   
• Inter-firm linkages among local firms, which are framed by ‘characteristic-
based’ trust and multiple forms of embeddedness, have greater resilience.  
However, the spatial fix of territorial embeddedness also reduces firms’ options 
for restructuring.  In contrast to exiting buyers, of course, local firms face have 
much deeper, relatively mobile ‘sunk’ investments.    
The pattern of outcomes highlights the multi-scalar relational character of trust and its 
crucial role in shaping the configuration of networks and the form of network 
embeddedness.  Unpredictable circumstances violated the multiple foundations of trust, 
increased business risk, and undermined network complementarities that could only 
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operate when co-actors were considered ‘trustworthy’.  Buyer responses show that 
without the buttress of institutional trust underpinned by regulation, interpersonal trust a 
fragile commodity.  Personal level trust was contingent on and underpinned by the 
maintenance of ‘institutional’ trust in regulatory structures at the transnational scale.  In 
this dialectic, any transformation of the regulatory framework implies revision of 
network relations and vice versa.   
 Crisis also exposed the interdependences between trust, power and 
embeddedness.  It highlighted the need to unpack the notion of embeddedness in global 
production networks and understand the diversity and dynamics of relational 
‘embeddedness’.  Relational positioning is the outcome of differences in the scope of 
firms’ interactions, the type of trust that characterises those interactions, as well as 
asymmetries in knowledge and power. An appreciation of the power-infused dynamics 
of network relationships provides the answer to the question of ‘what’ networks are 
embedded in – they are embedded in allegiances.   
Conclusion 
The relationships between firms, in all their diverse expressions, are constructed 
through the socio-institutional environment in which they operate (Gertler 2001). In this 
context, the impacts of negative events reverberate through the network, but with 
uneven effects reflecting the complexities of actors’ multiple associations.  Exploring 
the contradictory changes in relations of trust, risk, knowledge and power is crucial to 
understanding the underlying dynamics of global production networks.   As changing 
geo-political conditions undermine stability, characteristics of trust and expressions of 
power relations change interdependently and at multiple scales – from interpersonal 
relationships, to social networks, to institutional expectations and vice-versa.  In each 
dimension, the configuration and durability of network relationships is framed by the 
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regulatory regime.  Regulatory structures and national policies, therefore, are not simply 
a ‘milieu’ in which network interactions are played out, but are an active force in the 
constitution and reconstitution of relations between firms.  
 It follows that the extent to which production networks adopt web-like lattice or 
hierarchical chain formations is framed by the regulatory context, is territorially and 
temporally specific, and structured by firms’ and nations’ uneven capacities to exercise 
power and influence.  Moreover, whether network relationships appear as cooperative, 
trusting, competitive or hierarchical is contingent on geo-political conditions, the 
structures of regulation and firms’ strategic moves in the context of their multiple 
allegiances.   Spatially extensive networks proliferate in secure, stable and profitable 
production arrangements, but geographically proximate network relations are more 
resilient in conditions of uncertainty, when underlying power inequities sever 
contingent associations and bring deeper allegiances to prominence.   In conclusion, this 
suggests that the concept embeddedness could well to be replaced with a vocabulary 
highlighting mobility of associations and the multivalent, shifting and sometimes 
incompatible allegiances that develop between a diverse range of actors in different geo-
political environments.    
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Table 1  Embeddnessness, Trust and Power 
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Figure 1 Fiji Garment Exports, 1986 – 1997. 
Source: Unpublished tables from Trade Data Reports, Bureau of Statistics, Fiji, Suva.  
Note: Data based on constant 1993 Fiji dollar values.   
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Figure 2 The Fiji Garment Industry before the May 2000 Coup 
 
Source: compiled from interview data. 
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Figure 3 Revenue, Cost and Profit Margins, Fiji Clothing Firms, 1986-94 
Source: Unpublished tables, Fiji Bureau of Statistics, Census of Industries. 
Note: This is the most recent available data. 
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Figure 4 The Fiji Garment Industry after the May 2000 Coup 
 
Source: compiled from interview data. 
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